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Abstract Nash is famous for many inventions, but it is less known that he, simul-
taneously with Marschak, also was the first to axiomatize expected utility for risk.
In particular, these authors were the first to state the independence condition, a
condition that should have been but was not stated by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern. Marschak’s paper resulted from interactions with several people at the Cowles
Commission. We document unique letters and personal communications with Nash,
Samuelson, Arrow, Dalkey, and others, making plausible that Nashmade his discovery
independently from the others.
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Many contributions by John Nash in different fields have been well known and widely
appreciated. What has not been acknowledged is that, in his celebrated article “The
Bargaining Problem,” Nash (1950) was also the first to axiomatize expected utility
under risk, simultaneously with and independently of Marschak (1950). Thus, they
laid the foundations for decision theory for risk. In particular, they were the first to
correctly define the independence preference axiom, which plays a central role in the
empirical and normative debates about expected utility and its generalizations, central
topics for this journal. Fishburn and Wakker (1995) and Moscati (2016) discuss the
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general history of independence and related preference conditions. This note focuses
on the (shared) priority of Nash and the independence of his discovery.
Independence means that two indifferences P ∼ P′ and Q ∼ Q′ between lotteries
imply the indifference λP + (1 − λ)Q ∼ λP′ + (1 − λ)Q′ between probabilistic
mixtures of lotteries. It is necessary for transferring the mixture operation from lot-
teries to indifference classes of lotteries. The latter was done by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944), but they did not state the independence axiom, and therefore their
axiomatization was incomplete. They needed the expected utility model to evaluate
mixed strategies in their foundation of game theory. Only after the clarifications by
Nash andMarschak could this aspect of the foundations of game theory be understood.
For applications to game theory of the non-expected utility models introduced since
the 1980s, see Chen and Neilson (1999), Haller (2000), and many others.
In a series of unpublished working papers and conference papers appeared between
July 1948 andDecember 1949,Marschak, then a senior researcher at the Cowles Com-
mission in Chicago, Herman Rubin, a junior researcher at Cowles and a collaborator of
Marschak, and Norman Dalkey, a researcher at the RAND Corporation in Santa Mon-
ica, pointed out the omission of von Neumann and Morgenstern (Marschak 1948a, b,
1949a, b; Rubin 1949a, b; Dalkey 1949). Because Marschak (1950) is a publication
with early working paper versions of 1948 and 1949, we feel that Marschak deserves
priority over Rubin and Dalkey. Marschak’s (1950) acknowledgment, as well as wit-
nesses from those days such as Dalkey himself, Kenneth Arrow and Paul Samuelson
(documented by Bleichrodt et al. 2015), indicate that researchers at the Cowles Com-
mission and the RAND Corporation interacted much and shared their ideas. They did
not assign much importance to settling priority of the discovery of independence. We
know now, in retrospect, how important this condition is to distinguish theories.
Nash (1950) and Marschak (1950) appeared side by side in the April 1950 issue
of Econometrica. In the introductory section of his article, Nash (1950, pp. 156–157)
put forward a series of assumptions that warrant expected utility theory. In particular,
Nash’s assumption 5 is the independence preference axiom, and coincides with the
postulate Marschak (1949b, 1950) had called Postulate IV2. Like Marschak, Rubin
or Dalkey, Nash did not assign much importance to the independence assumption, nor
claimed any originality or priority for it. He simply needed expected utility and just
wrote it down, apparently unaware that it was new and that he was correcting von
Neumann and Morgenstern (Nash 1998). In effect, we argue, unlike researchers at
Cowles and RAND, Nash discovered the independence idea on his own, and notably
without interactions with Marschak, Rubin or Dalkey. He used to work on his own,
and could develop whatever he needed.
Various types of evidence support the independence of Nash’s invention. The main
ideas for the bargaining problem article occurred to Nash in spring 1948 when, as
an undergraduate student in mathematics at the Carnegie Institute of Technology, he
attended the only course in economics he ever attended, namely an elective course on
international trade given by Bert Hoselitz (Nash 1994; Nasar 1998). Nash acquired
the analytical tools to suitably model the bargaining problem only after beginning his
Ph.D. in mathematics at Princeton in September 1948, and becoming acquainted with
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games. He wrote the bargaining problem
paper in spring 1949, during his second semester at Princeton (Nasar 1998), and in
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it he cited as only reference Theory of Games. He also thanked von Neumann and
Morgenstern, and only them, for reading the original version of the paper and giving
him some advice on how to present the ideas contained in it. When the paper was
published in April 1950, Nash was still a Ph.D. student. At that time, he was in fact
completing his dissertation on “Non-Cooperative Games”, which he would defend on
May 29, 1950 (Nash 1948–2002).
The above-described genesis of the 1950 article suggests that the gifted Ph.D.
student Nash wrote it much in isolation, interacting only with von Neumann and
Morgenstern. With regard to the unpublished working papers of Marschak, Rubin and
Dalkey, it is highly unlikely that Nash was aware of them. These unpublished works
circulated at Cowles and RAND, but not in Princeton. The online catalogues of the
libraries of Princeton University and the Institute for Advanced Studies, in fact, do
not display any trace of them (search carried out on September 24, 2015). Nash did
spend his first research period at RAND in 1950. But this was only in summer 1950,
that is, some months after the publication of the bargaining problem article (Nash
1948–2002).
The independence of Nash’s discovery is further supported by the recollections
of Samuelson, who in 1950 was one of the major players in the debate on expected
utility and the independence axiom (Samuelson 1950a, b, c). According to Samuelson
(1992)1: “I now have no memory of 1950 Nash as being in the ‘independence’ act.
[…] Nash was a loner and I know of no ‘influences’ on him.”
We conclude that Nash shares priority with Marschak on axiomatizing expected
utility and thus on opening the rich field of axiomatizations for decision under risk.
This intellectual contribution of Nash deserves wide recognition.
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